Gale dynamic coordination games

On the other hand, holding period length fixed, there exist equilibria in which delay is proportional to N, for arbitrarily large values of N. In addition, it can be shown that the possibility of delay depends on the "timing" of strategic complementarities.

However, under certain conditions, delay is shown to be a robust phenomenon, in the sense that "well-behaved" equilibria exhibit infinite delay for N sufficiently large.

Dynamic coordination games. N2 - Gains from coordination provide incentives for delay. AB - Gains from coordination provide incentives for delay. To add on the fun, turn it into a competition, and reward the student who can hold their pose the longest!

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Families, educators and after school programs have a stake…. Share This Article. Related Articles. This paper grew out of discussions with Christophe Chamley.

Joe Farrell, Drew Fudenberg, Martin Hellwig and Sawoong Kang made very useful comments on an earlier version that led to substantial improvements. I would like to thank Nick Yannelis and an anonymous referee for their editorial advice. SES Reprints and Permissions. Dynamic coordination games. Econ Theory 5, 1—18 Download citation. Received : 05 November Revised : 15 January Issue Date : February Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:.

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Skip to main content. Search SpringerLink Search. Summary Gains from coordination provide incentives for delay. References Admati, A. Columbia University, unpublished Chamley, C. Young, H. Download references.

You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar. Reprints and Permissions. Dynamic focal points in N -person coordination games. Theor Decis 40, — Download citation.

Issue Date : May Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:. Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article. Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative.

Skip to main content. Search SpringerLink Search. Abstract To understand how groups coordinate, we study infinitely repeated N -player coordination games in the context of strategic uncertainty.